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The subject of this article appeared in Call of Duty: Black Ops.

Summary[]

The 3 Intel documentation collected from S.O.G details back-story and history of operatives Jason Hudson and Frank Woods as well as the history, founding and actions of the North Vietnamese Army (N.V.A)

Intel[]

DOCUMENT 1[]

CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTATION

CIA: CB987:78:6546

DATE: February 24, 1962

MEMORANDUM TO: Richard King (ADDO/SAD)

FROM: Ryan Jackson, Chief Analyst (APLAA)

SUBJECT: S.A.D CANDIDATE (HUDSON, JASON)

PLACE OF BIRTH: Washington, D.C., USA

NATIONALITY: American/Caucasian

D.O.B: 03/26/1932

AGE: 30

HEIGHT: 6'0"

BUILD: Athletic

WEIGHT: 210lbs

EYES: Blue

HAIR: Brown

SUMMARY PROFILE: As a double-major in Psychology and Political Science, Jason Hudson was recruited to the Agency out of Georgetown University on the recommendation of his academic advisor and former O.S.S field operative Marshall Bryant (recipient of the Intelligence Star, 1950).

Hudson is an excellent tactician and mission coordinator, bringing the full brunt of his genius-level IQ into the field. As such, he has earned great trust within the halls of Langley and will undoubtedly go far considering his ability to command a room and crisis management skills. As one associate commented "Jason has a way with words; when he speaks, you can't help but listen."

Though much of his work keeps him away from the front lines, Hudson is a very capable soldier in his own right (U.S Army 101st Airborne, honorable discharge, 1955), particularly when a mission calls for an element of subtlety and finesse.

(Full service record and psychological analysis enclosed.)

DOCUMENT 2[]

S.O.G

DATE: September 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO: William Colby (Chief, Far East Division, DDP)

FROM: Ryan Jackson, (Chief Analyst, APLAA), in conjunction with OSA/DI

SUBJECT: Proposal for additional Agency presence within Combat Base at MGRS 48QXD850418 (Khe Sanh, South Vietnam) and expansion of Air America efforts into Laos

  1. Enclosed is a proposal for expansion of Agency efforts in the nation of Laos via the use of Khe Sanh Combat Base and Airstrip.
  2. US Special Forces recently constructed a combat base at the MGRS 48QXD850418 airstrip has presented the Agency with an opportunity to create a forward presence for future covert operations in nearby Laos. Despite concerns regarding the defensive inadequacies of this location (see Point 2), overall assessment if that the location offers a number of benefits for planned (S.A.D/POO missions to support Hmong leadership as well as expansion of Air America effort into Laos.
  3. U-2 reconnaissance photographs and ground-level surveys (TAB A) have shown Khe Sanh Combat Base and its adjacent airstrip to be potentially vulnerable to enemy artillery; this information was relayed to the D.o.D in June 1962 but construction commenced regardless (original report can be found in TAB B).
  4. MACV-SOG Recon Teams have already established a base of operations from this base in order to execute their established programs of harrassment, diversion, capture of prisoners, physical destruction, intelligience gathering, and generating propoganda on the orders of General William Westmoreland (TAB C).
  5. With the pre-existing inter-agency relations established between the S.A.D and MACV-SOG efforts, additional deployment of S.A.D/P.O.O personnel will be accepted as an expansion of MACV-SOG efforts. In parallel, Agency interests to support the military financial requirement of Hmong leader Major General Vang Pao through the transportation of ??????? and ??????? will continue as planned.

Enclosures

DOCUMENT 3[]

DATE: January 23, 1968

MEMORANDUM TO: William Colby (Chief, Far East Division, DDP)

From: Ryan Jackson, Chief Analyst (APLAA)

SUBJECT: Compilation of analysis of the Vietnam People's Army capabilities as they relate to the recent outbreak of fighting at KSCB (for review).

  1. At the request of Defense Secretary McNamara, enclosed is a full compilation of APLAA analysis, HUMINT, and recent U2 surveillance of PAVN troop movements from 12 Sept - 22 Dec 1967 for your review. (For the purposes of this overview, the Vietnam People's Army will forthwith be referred to as the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) in order to distinguish between the Northern Communists and their Southern counterparts.
  2. Historical analysis (TAB A) begins with the Armed Propaganda Unit (APU) for National Liberation, a force of less than 1,000 fighters led by General Vo Nguyen Giap, which drove French colonialists and Japanese occupying forces from Vietnam. By 1950, the APU officially became what we now term the NVA (also known as People's Army of Vietnam or PAVN). Over the next 10 years the size of the standing force grew to over 150,000 troops spread over 13 divisions. Of note are the 330 and 338 Divisions, which consists of transplanted Southern Communists (organised after the Geneva Accord of 1954). However, many of these fighters were conscripted into the collective farming workforce to meet productivity demands.
  3. Organizational analysis (TAB B) shows a "triple-armed" approach composed of the Main Force (standing combat ready troops and support units), local forces, and civil defense/guerrilla force. These are subdivided into 5 distinct branches including Ground Forces, Border Defense Forces, Marines, Aor Defense, and the People's Navy.
  4. Since 1960, analysis shows that the main supplier of NVA military hardware is the Soviet Union (full list of provided equipment types can be found attached to TAB C).
  5. Tactical analysis of (TAB D) consists of Offensive and Defensive Operations, employment of extensive Booby Trap techniques, the NVA Sapper Corps (units specializing in lightening fast attacks on U.S bases and defensive installations), and finally hit & run operations known as "Standoff Attacks" with a utilization of rockets, recoilless rifles, and mortars. Maneuverability and populace control are the key to the N VA's ability to maintain their grip on the local populace and remain elusive from Allied forces.

Enclosures

DOCUMENT 4[]

CLASSIFIED

DATE: September 5, 1960

MEMORANDUM TO: Richard M. Nixon (VPOTUS), Allen Dulles (DCIA), Admiral Arleigh Burke (CNO), Livingston Merchant (State), Gordon Gray (APNSA), Colonel J.C King (Chief WHD)

FROM: Ryan Jackson, Chief Analyst (APLAA)

SUBJECT: OP-40 Candidate #15 (WOODS, FRANK)

PLACE OF BIRTH: Philadelphia, PA, USA

NATIONALITY: American/Caucasian

D.O.B: 03/20/1930

AGE: 30

HEIGHT: 6'0''

BUILD: Medium

WEIGHT: 190lbs

EYES: Brown

HAIR: Brown

SUMMARY PROFILE: The candidate is best described as an "old warhorse," a man increasingly out of step with the rapidly changing world around him. Though still fit for active duty, he knows that his days in the field are numbered and he has stated on numerous occasions that he intends to go out with "the biggest fucking bang the world has ever seen."

A fiercely patriotic and decorated veteran of the Korean war, the candidate is fiercely a consummate leader, possessed with a first-rate ability to assess and respond to any situation with quick and decisive action, in other words, absolutely nothing fazes him.

(Full service record and psychological analysis enclosed)

Gallery[]

Intel Items[]

  • Intel No. 10: (1/3) This intel is located on an ammo crate in the back area after the destruction of the three tanks.
  • Intel No. 11: (2/3) This intel is located on the bottom left bunker on the right window after Woods kicks a barrels down the hill.
  • Intel No. 12: (3/3) After saving Woods, the team will head into a huge bunker. The intel will be on a shelf next to a crate topped with beer.
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